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Cultural Intelligence in the Study of Intelligence
Abstract
Intelligence officers often interact in culturally diverse settings different from the settings
in which they grew up. Yet, there is a lack of academic research about the integration of
culture and the study of intelligence. Researchers have made Cultural Intelligence (CQ)
measurable via the Cultural Intelligence Scale (CQS) and successfully applied it in the
business world as a predictor of success in multi-cultural environments. This article
describes an application of the CQS, using the Observer Report questionnaire to assess the
memoirs of three successful intelligence officers to ascertain the degree that CQ applies to
the success of officers in United States Intelligence Community (USIC) in multicultural
environments. The study results indicated each intelligence officer possessed a high degree
of cultural intelligence that assisted in the course of their duties and the CQS is a good
assessment tool to measure cultural intelligence.
Keywords: Cultural intelligence, Cultural Intelligence Scale, CQS, Cultural Intelligence
Quotient
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Introduction
One of the purposes of the United States Intelligence Community (IC) is
to collect, interpret, and process raw information into intelligence for use
by various policy and decision makers.1 A nation with interests abroad
must work in foreign environments distinct from its domestic culture,
necessitating a level of cultural aptitude. In the same way that people have
innate emotional intelligence or social intelligence, they also have levels of
cultural intelligence, defined as someone’s capability to function
effectively in culturally diverse settings. 2 Intelligence officers abroad are
operating in diverse cultural environments, interacting with people,
systems, and customs different from those most likely in which they grew
up. Analysts and consumers of intelligence reports in their home country
also interpret intelligence through their ethnocentric lens and biases.
High degrees of cultural intelligence facilitate deeper insights, learning,
and performance in culturally diverse environments.3 A lack of cultural
intelligence can lead to inefficiency and can have consequences. For
example, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) parachuted teams of
paramilitary officers into North Korea during the Korean War, it was
hoping for the same successes as the Jedburgh teams of World War II. 4
While the Jedburgh teams enjoyed cultural similarities to their host
nations, the teams inserted into North Korea did not. Consequently,
thousands of intelligence operatives lost their lives when they were sent
across enemy lines and never heard from again due to a fundamental
misunderstanding of communist methods of cultural control in the
villages of North Korea.5
Cultural intelligence is measurable through the Cultural Intelligence Scale
(CQS), a series of statements designed to address four aspects
(motivational, cognitive, metacognitive, and behavioral) of cultural
intelligence and measure each aspect on a numerical scale, with an
aggregate score providing an overall measure of cultural intelligence.6 The
purpose of this qualitative case study was to assess the cultural
intelligence of US intelligence officers by applying the CQS Observer
Report to a sample of officers’ autobiographies. The results of the
assessment were evaluated to determine the extent to which CQS might
be an effective indicator of an intelligence officer’s ability to navigate
culturally diverse situations. The research question was, to what extent is
the CQS an effective indicator of an intelligence officer’s success in
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culturally diverse situations? To answer the research question, the
primary author conducted an analysis of the memoirs of three intelligence
officers generally considered successful by members of the USIC: Barry
Broman of the CIA, Samuel Faddis of the CIA, and Oleg Kalugin formerly
of the Soviet Union’s premiere foreign intelligence agency, the Komitet
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), using the CQS Observer Report to
evaluate each officer’s cultural intelligence.7 The foundation for the
research rested on the theory of cultural intelligence that posits an
individual’s capability to interact in a culturally appropriate manner is
dependent on his or her ability to manage interactions across the four
aspects of cultural intelligence. 8 The thesis for this research is, Cultural
intelligence, derived from the field of cultural anthropology and
successfully applied to a wide variety of interdisciplinary subjects, is an
asset to intelligence officers interacting with foreign cultures. Lack of
cultural intelligence can lead to varying degrees of failure, from
fundamental misinterpretation of data to loss of life. The article proceeds
in the following manner: the literature review, followed by the
methodology, data analysis and findings, and recommendations.

Literature Review
A Background in Anthropology
The manner in which people behave in culturally diverse environments is
relative to their Cultural Intelligence Quotient (CQ), defined as an
individual’s capability to function and manage effectively in culturally
diverse settings and is analogous to similar measures of intelligence such
as emotional intelligence and social intelligence. 9 In 2008, a team of
researchers defined CQ further by identifying four key aspects
Motivational, cognitive, metacognitive, and behavioral.10 Motivational CQ
reflects an individual’s willingness to devote time and energy to learning
about and functioning in situations characterized by cultural difference.
Cognitive CQ regards base knowledge of facts, norms and practices of a
given culture derived from personal experience and education.
Metacognitive CQ regards the mental processes individuals use to gain
and process cultural knowledge, including monitoring their thought
process regarding how they perceive culture. People with a high degree of
metacognitive CQ are consciously aware of other’s cultural preferences
from start to finish in a multicultural interaction and seek to constantly
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refine and adjust mental models of that culture.11 Behavioral CQ
encompass their capability to act and speak appropriately in culturally
diverse settings.12
Based on three dimensions intercultural success against a numeric scale,
the CQS enables CQ measurement. The three aspects of the scale are
cultural judgement, cultural adaption, and task performance in cultural
settings.13 Researchers have found a variety of applications of the CQS as
an indicator of multicultural success across a broad range of disciplines.
People with high levels of CQ generally are better travelers, function at a
higher capacity while traveling, are usually better industry leaders, and
are generally better global strategic leaders.14
Interdisciplinary Anthropology in Other Social Sciences
The applications of cultural anthropology have done much for other
academic disciplines, with terms such as ethnocentrism and culture
infiltrating the lexicon of most social sciences and offering valuable
insights on social perception. The study of cultural anthropology is useful
in understanding the importance of culture. Immediately relevant to the
study of strategic intelligence is the concept of ethnocentrism, the implicit
evaluation of a culture different from an individual’s, according to
preconceptions originating in the standards and customs of that one’s
own’s culture. Values, perception, and information are each influenced by
ethnocentrism, and often present in the form of cultural bias. 15 A
byproduct of cultural bias is the creation of the other, a value judgement
levied upon a foreign culture that inhibits understanding and often
subordinates the foreign culture to a lower position on a social
hierarchy.16 The implication is that people behave and perceive differently
in culturally diverse environments.
Examples of the application of cultural anthropology illustrate the
importance and impact that culture has in strategic settings. General
Petraeus’ understanding and implementation of cultural intelligence via a
counterinsurgency campaign in the Iraq War successfully decreased
violence in the conflict, significantly reducing the number of annual
civilian deaths from 23,333 killed in 2007 to 1,600 by the end of 2011. 17
Ken Booth’s idea of strategic culture is the belief that a nation and group
can often prescribe and predict its behavior through a certain national
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lens of culture is another successful application of cultural
anthropology.18 Strategic culture has since been used to interpret North
Korea’s outlook on threat perception and subsequent development of
nuclear weapons and China’s nearly millennia long genealogy of strategic
culture that it still enacts. 19
A Gap Between Strategic Intelligence and Cultural Anthropology
Despite cultural anthropology enjoying a broad variety of use in other
social sciences, it has yet to have a meaningful impact on the study of
intelligence—there is a gap between the study of strategic intelligence and
cultural anthropology. This is partly due to the study of intelligence
largely stemming from the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of
the CIA during World War II, and its tendency to recruit from east coast
universities.20 Following the war, these academics-turned-intelligenceofficers returned to academia and brought with them their experiences,
thus creating the study of intelligence.21 Additionally, the CIA actively
supports the study of intelligence by regularly declassifying documents for
the express purpose of academic study.22 While the CIA was the first
intelligence agency to do so, other international agencies that have since
followed suite tend to originate from Western Europe containing Western
viewpoints.23 So while cultural anthropology attempts largely to
encompass global perspectives, the study of intelligence is mired in what
Aldrich and Kasuku called a Western myopia, limiting the study of
intelligence in pre-conceived notions of what intelligence can and cannot
be.24 By way of example, Aldrich and Kasuku point to the People’s
Republic of China’s approach toward information as intelligence and most
Chinese entities abroad as a collectors, as well as South Africa’s use of
intelligence to bolster domestic social programs as different cultural
paradigms for intelligence.25 These cases alone make it clear that there are
different perspectives and approaches to intelligence than in main-stream
circulation in the West.
Since then, this Western myopia has hindered the US in its national policy
efforts. Anthony Lewis identifies the lack of cultural understanding as one
of the reasons the United States lost the Vietnam War. 26 Lewis also
asserts that classical misunderstandings of Vietnamese society and
American ethnocentrism damaged South Vietnamese efforts to stand up
their government based in democracy. 27 While Americans assumed the
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base of Vietnamese culture to be religion and the government as it is in
the US, Lewis understood the Vietnamese to have basis in ethics on the
concept of The Village, from where, along with some strong Confucian
background, many Vietnamese social mores derive from. 28 Americans
projected their ethnocentric values of religion in the form of the Catholic
Ngo Diem and ignored his rampant corruption and inability to lead.
Additionally, Americans leveraged Diem to institute government from the
top down. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese went straight to the cultural
base of power, the village, attempting control from the bottom up. 29 The
result was an ineffectual effort on the part of the Americans and a
calculated, efficient one on the part of the North Vietnamese. Following
the 9/11 attacks, United States intelligence reform became a major topic
of discussion, yet absent from that discussion was the role of culture.
Hamrah argued for several tools to assess what role, if any, organizational
culture had in the failure to predict the 9/11 attacks and offered a series of
guided questions designed to assist the USIC in the intentional design and
creation of a functional organizational culture.30
While Aldrich, Hamrah, and Lewis all introduce cultural anthropology, or
aspects of culture for the study of intelligence, each illuminates the gap
between the study of intelligence and the study of culture. Each author
recommended further integration of their research and identified culture
clearly as a missing link. Hamrah called for the further study of the
internal culture of the intelligence community while Aldrich and Kasuku,
and Lewis each recommended greater interdisciplinary efforts between
anthropology and intelligence.31 The concept and terminology of CQ is
nearly absent from the USIC. Despite having published a literature review
in 2005 identifying the importance and relevance of Ang’s and Van Dyne’s
work on CQ, the CIA has not officially embraced the concept of CQ;
instead it recommended the work as a break from other books on an
intelligence officer’s bookshelf.32 In 2015, a master’s thesis used the CQS
to evaluate the CQ of the Operation JAWBREAKER team to demonstrate
that CQ is an integral factor in a successful covert action operation in
contrast to characteristics of intelligence officers.33 Beyond these two
sources there is a scarcity of literature indicating the application of CQ in
the USIC.
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Methodology
Overview and Case Selection
This qualitative case study used Ang’s and Van Dyne’s Cultural
Intelligence Observer statements and scale to assess the CQ of three
intelligence officers.34 The number of case studies selected considered the
time available to conduct the research during an 8-week master’s course.
The primary researcher determined criteria for the cases to consider. 35
The criteria used for case selection included regular action and interaction
in multicultural environments, employment with and for a state
intelligence organization, and ease of accessibility to the autobiographies.
The primary researcher selected each intelligence officer based on the
above criteria and having read and studied the autobiographies, and by
determining each officer spent time spent in multicultural environments.
Within the USIC, fellow officers and managers admire each of the
intelligence officers selected for this research. The officers grew up
primarily in the West and share an occupation as intelligence officers with
overseas experience. Each notably hails from a different background, with
one officer serving in the KGB before his eventual defection to the West
while the other two worked in the United States before their tours abroad
as CIA case officers.
Oleg Kalugin began as a KGB case officer, adroitly running operatives on
behalf of the Soviet Union for years on US soil before he eventually
defected to the West.36 Barry Broman successfully ran intelligence
operations in South East Asia with the CIA for nearly two decades,
including serving as the Chief of Station in a prominent country there. 37
Sam Faddis (CIA) inserted into Northern Iraq prior to the invasion of Iraq
in 2003 and organized Kurdish forces on the Iraq-Turkey border into a
fighting force and successfully waged a guerrilla war once the invasion
began.38 Through assessing these three intelligence officers by applying
the CQS Observer Report statements, the researchers developed a
baseline for use in follow on studies of officers within the USIC.
Assessment Strategy
Following case study selection and reading each autobiography, the
primary researcher applied the CQS to code and score responses to the
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statements. The CQS Observer Report consists of 20 statements divided
into four categories reflecting the four dimensions of CQ: Motivational,
cognitive, metacognitive, and behavioral.39 Using a scale from one to
seven, with a score of one representing the observer strongly disagrees the
subject displays the evaluated tendency, the researcher assessed each
statement. In contrast, a score of seven indicates the observer strongly
agrees the subject shows the evaluated tendency. The primary researcher
looked for statements, or a series of statements that represented and
indicated each author’s thoughts on each CQ dimension, and qualitatively
assigned a score along the CQ scale for 16 of 20 statements because four
statements required face to face assessments, which the primary
researcher could not make based on reading and studying
autobiographies. For example, when Broman was accidentally served a
cockroach in a bowl of noodles while first acclimating to Thai culture, he
carefully evaluated the situation in terms of culture in a deliberate effort
not to commit a social faux pas.40 In addition, he recalled that Thai
sometimes eat other fried insects as a delicacy and politely asked his Thai
host whether it was part of the dish. 41 Since the cockroach was not
supposed to be part of the dish, Broman displayed strong metacognitive
tendencies, as he demonstrated thinking about culture, and successfully
navigated the multicultural interaction without offending his hosts.
Broman’s behavior in this example is consistent with a score of seven for
statement four in the metacognitive section of the CQS; “this person
checks the accuracy of his cultural knowledge as he interacts with people
from different cultures.”42
After individual statement scoring, the scores were averaged, by CQ
aspect, as opposed to a summation of total points, because it was
unfeasible to assess certain statements as an evaluator using
autobiographies. For example, a researcher cannot assess behavioral
statement two, “this person uses pause and silence differently to suit
different cross-cultural situations” based on reading alone.43 Normally, a
researcher would conduct an in-person interview to make that
assessment. However, since the research was part of a master’s course
project with a short course duration, the researcher used autobiographies
as proxies for in-person interviews.
On aspects such as behavior, where the researcher could not attribute a
score, the CQ statement was omitted from scoring and analysis so as not
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to affect the average. The researcher excluded behavioral statements one
through four due to the inability to evaluate these statements using the
autobiographies. However, sufficient evidence in the autobiographies
facilitated an evaluation of behavioral statement five regarding facial cues
when authors wrote about the faces they made or significant reactions
they expressed in multicultural interactions. Notwithstanding the
numerical value assigned to the evaluation of each sample’s CQS the
nature of the evaluation remains qualitative due to the method of
evaluation. The researcher experienced few issues evaluating the
autobiographies, but recommends that subsequent studies attempt in
person interviews to collect data more accurately and avoid author bias.
Limitations and Biases
All research contains limitations and biases. Limitations are a result of the
types and sources of historical documents, lack of access to study subjects,
small sample sizes, sampling bias, incorrect assumption, and human error
such as incorrect data interpretation, measurement, and coding.
Researchers also have cognitive biases that could inadvertently affect
interpretation. For example, the study subjects did not write their
autobiographies with CQS interpretation in mind, which may have led to
missed mis-coding and subsequent incorrect analysis. To minimize
limitations and biases, the primary researcher took precautions to
validate authenticity and triangulate data checking additional sources as
needed.
Based on the qualitative method of inquiry and case study format,
generalizing the research findings to the larger population is a known
limitation of this research. This was an additional reason for the inclusion
of three study subjects as cases. Finally, the researcher mitigated
limitations and bias throughout the research process to boost the
reliability and accuracy of the findings.

Analysis and Findings
Overall analysis revealed each of the officers studied possessed high
degrees of cultural intelligence in the categories studied. With each
statement scored from one to seven, then averaged by CQ Aspect,
averages appear high across the sample. It is likely the subjects’ written
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accounts of their actions demonstrates higher cultural intelligence than
might be observed had an interview taken place due to the reflection and
editing process an author typically undergoes when publishing a book.
Table 1 presents the summary results.
Table 1: Summary Assessment
CQ Aspect
Motivational
Cognitive

Metacognitive

Behavioral

Statement
This person truly enjoys interacting
with people from different cultures.
This person can describe different
ways to motivate and reward people
across cultures.
This person adjusts their
understanding of a culture while
interacting with people from that
culture.
This person modifies how close or
far apart they stand when
interacting with people from
different cultures.
Average

Broman

Faddis

Kalugin

7.00

5.40

6.40

6.50

6.00

6.17

7.00

7.00

6.75

6.00

6.00

6.00

6.63

6.10

6.33

Note: Data compiled by researcher during analysis based on the CQ scoring scale from
CQS Observer Report. Each of the CQ Aspect scores is an average. Statement
terminology provided by Dr. Linn Van Dyne and used with permission (email, January
11, 2022).

Broman scored high across motivational cultural intelligence given that
he went on to start a tourism company in the countries he served while
working for the CIA. While Broman scored similarly to the other officers
evaluated in the study on cognitive cultural intelligence, he was either
uncomfortable using foreign languages regularly or chose not to, despite
having a solid foundation in Thai. 44 Throughout his memoir, Broman
displayed strong metacognitive tendencies, which is to say at several
points revealed he was thinking about thinking about culture. Notable are
examples include his discussions on the ex-patriot community in South
East Asia and the community’s tendency to love its country of origin, but
felt compelled to stay abroad despite his analysis of Thai royalty.45.
Throughout Borman’s autobiography, he displayed a strong affection for
living abroad and interacting with different cultures. 46 Compositely,
Broman showed the strongest signs of cultural intelligence of the three
cases.
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Faddis scored lowest on the CQS with a composite average of 6.10. His
score, however, suggests a potential gap in applying the CQS to
paramilitary officers. By most measures, Faddis succeeded in his task of
inserting himself into Northern Iraq ahead of the United States’ invasion,
organizing an alliance of Kurdish led forces backed by international allies,
and leading the Kurdish forces during the invasion to capture the
northern Iraqi city of Mosul.47 While Faddis gave strong evidence for
cognitive and metacognitive cultural intelligence, exemplified by his
adroit management of the Turkish-Kurdish tensions, he did not want to
stay in Iraq for extended periods of time. While the CQS might indicate
this is a lack of cultural intelligence it is more than likely because Faddis
was fighting a war and war is physically and emotionally demanding. In
many other aspects his high degree of cultural intelligence is clear. 48
Kalugin, a former highly decorated KGB officer who eventually defected
to the United States, also scored highly on the CQS with an average of
6.33. However, if Kalugin’s motivational and behavioral cultural
intelligence were higher it was not apparent in his autobiography. Kalugin
made multiple references to his appreciation of American culture,
indicating high levels of cognitive and metacognitive cultural
intelligence.49 While he expressed that the United States was a much
more convenient and wealthy country than the Soviet Union, it is was also
clear that his ultimate allegiance and desires fell to Russia and his choice
to defect to the United States was likely because he was forced rather than
choosing to live abroad.50
Cumulatively, the case studies provide compelling evidence that the CQS
is an effective predictor of an intelligence officer’s success in multicultural environments. The case studies provided an association between
a high degree of cultural intelligence and success in multi-cultural
environments—albeit not necessarily intelligence operations. The
implication is that the cultural intelligence helped these officers navigate
the cultural complexity of the intelligence operation at a minimum, with
likely positive impact on the intelligence operation, at best.

Conclusion
The literature review revealed a gap between anthropology and
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intelligence studies not only in this research but also measured by the
dearth of academic literature addressing the two disciplines, cultural
intelligence has yet to be sufficiently associated with the academic study
of strategic security and the USIC. This research narrows that gap by
formally introducing the theory of cultural intelligence to the field of
intelligence and applying it to the memoirs of three intelligence officers.
The results of the study demonstrate these intelligence officers possessed
a high degree of CQ and it aided them in the successful accomplishment
of their operations. Despite hailing from different backgrounds, including
one officer working for an intelligence agency competing with the one
employing the other two, CQ remained consistently high across the cases
studied.
Way Forward
The applications for using CQ in the USIC are plentiful. Researchers
should seek to establish a baseline in the IC and use it as a basis for
further research and comparison. Long term studies across the USICs
agencies, investigating their varying paradigms and how they interact
with and interpret foreign intelligence would do much to reveal potential
bias present in analysis. Researchers should investigate the role that CQ
contributes to intelligence analysis, and researchers can extend it to
intelligence consumers (policy makers) as well. It is preferable for
researchers to conduct CQ evaluations in person with direct access to
study subjects. Historically, the lack of cultural understanding has created
a blind spot in the study of intelligence as well as the practice of
intelligence in the field. The study of cultural intelligence and its
application within the practice of intelligence serves as a force multiplier
for intelligence agencies, with high CQ officers performing successfully in
the field. Lack of cultural understanding has led to failed implementation
of national policy abroad, faulty analysis of foreign intelligence, and
significant loss of life among officers and agents. CQ is a factor already at
play in the USIC and its effect ought to be explored fully.
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